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Throughout the world laws and regulations constrain the activity of economic agents and
have substantial impact on the economic performance of diﬀerent countries. Economic, social
and political reasons are used to justify them, although very rarely any empirical evidence
exists to back these up. However, the degree of compliance with regulation is likely to be
as important for its impact as the details of the particular rule being enforced, although it
is usually not explicitly considered. Economists study both the eﬀect of regulation on social
and economic outcomes (e.g., Heckman and Pages, 2003, Besley and Burgess, 2003), and the
eﬀect of enforcement on compliance with regulation (e.g., Levitt, 1997, 2004) in a variety of
settings, but the two problems are not analyzed together. These two issues can and should
be studied simultaneously: if variation in enforcement causes changes in compliance, then it
will also have an eﬀect on economic performance because the degree with which a given law
is applied will vary.
In this paper we look to labor markets in Brazil and we examine two important issues on
which our current empirical knowledge is quite limited: 1) what is the impact of enforcement
on the employment of informal labor?; 2) what is the impact of increased labor ﬂexibility
on ﬁrm performance and total employment? In particular, we analyze how labor inspections
and ﬁnes aﬀect the demand for informal (illegal) labor by ﬁrms, and how access to informal
(ﬂexible) labor aﬀects ﬁrm performance. Our empirical work integrates these two problems
using insights from the literature on regulation, informality, crime and labor demand.1
Our work focuses on Brazil because it has one of the most regulated labor markets in the
world (e.g., Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2003).2 Furthermore,
enforcement of the law is apparently weak since approximately 40% of total employment is
1We do not explicitly examine the damage illegal behavior inﬂicts on institutions and social protection.
However, on the latter point the available evidence is not clear. Even though labor market institutions are
usually used to explain diﬀerences in inequality across developed countries (e.g., Blau and Khan, 1996), it has
been repeatedly shown that regulation can actually be detrimental to poverty and inequality in developing
countries (e.g., Besley and Burgess, 2003, and the essays in Heckman and Pages, 2003).
2A c c o r d i n gt ot h eDoing Business data set collected by the World Bank, Brazil has the third strictest labor
regulation in the world. Labor market regulations changed signiﬁcantly in 1988 with the new constitution,
increasing the degree of worker’s protection. A brief description of the current state of labor market regulation
in Brazil is presented in table A1.
2in the informal sector. Even though labor regulation is the same in all Brazilian states, its
enforcement is highly decentralized. This generates considerable variation in the degree of
government monitoring faced by ﬁrms in diﬀerent areas (which can be explored econometri-
cally). Finally, there are three good sources of data which we combine in our study. First,
we use a ﬁrm level dataset collected by the World Bank with standard information on invest-
ment, employment, sales and value added, but with unique information on the employment
of informal workers (and other types of illegal behavior of ﬁrms). Second, from adminis-
trative data from the Ministry of Labor we construct measures of the enforcement of labor
regulation at the local level. Third, we use information on the economic and demographic
characteristics of all the cities where the ﬁrms in our sample are located collected by two
Brazilian statistical and research institutes.
We explore the within country variation in the enforcement of regulation to analyze how
it aﬀects the ﬁrm’s employment of informal workers and the ﬁrm’s performance. We argue
that the main channel by which enforcement of regulation aﬀects ﬁrm performance is by
reducing the ﬁrm’s access to unregulated and ﬂexible labor. However, enforcement can vary
across locations for several reasons, and not all of them can be considered exogenous in our
empirical work. Therefore we control for an extensive set of ﬁrm and local level variables
which are likely to be important determinants of informal behavior, ﬁrm performance and
enforcement. In addition, we use a set of instrumental variables for enforcement which are
measures of access of labor inspectors to the ﬁrms in their region, and a proxy for general
law enforcement in the region.
We ﬁnd that increased enforcement in the area where ﬁrms are located leads to a substan-
tial reduction in the amount of the informal workers they employ. We also ﬁnd that it leads
to a large decreases in value added per worker, sales per worker, net wages and capital per
worker. We do not ﬁnd any evidence that stricter enforcement changes total employment
(suggesting that ﬁrms simply substitute informal for formal workers). The elasticities of
informal employment and labor productivity with respect to enforcement are approximately
-0.12 and -0.1 (respectively). These estimates imply that an increase in labor ﬂexibility due
to an increase in informal employment by 1 percentage point increases productivity in 3.5%.
3Our paper contributes and relates to three diﬀerent strands of literature. First we relate
to the literature on the economics of crime. Even though the incentives of criminals have
been studied extensively (e.g., Becker, 1962, and Levitt, 2004) very little is known empirically
about the ﬁrm’s incentives to hire informal workers and how enforcement can reduce illegal
behavior. Our estimates of the elasticity of crime with respect to enforcement are similar
in magnitude to those found in other contexts by Levitt (1998) and Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote
(2004).
Second, our paper is related with the literature that analyses the consequences of re-
strictive labor market regulations on economic eﬃciency. A large part of this literature uses
cross country variation to identify the eﬀects of more restrictive labor regulation on aggre-
gate outcomes (e.g., Nickell and Layard, 2000, Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes
and Shleifer, 2003, Heckman and Pages, 2003). The evidence from this literature suggest
that stringent labor marker regulation hamper productivity growth.3 More closely related
to our work are Holmes (1998) and Besley and Burgess (2003). Holmes (1998) exlores varia-
tion across states in the US and shows that states which enacted pro-business right-to-work
laws had increases in manufacturing activity. Besley and Burgess (2003) also ﬁnd important
eﬀects of labor regulation on output, employment, investment and productivity in Indian
manufacturing. Like us, both papers explore regional variation within a country. However,
our analysis focus on diﬀerences in the enforcement of the labor regulation, not on diﬀerences
in the regulation itself. Moreover, we use ﬁrm level outcomes instead of regional data.
Finally our work also relates to the literature on informality. The available cross country
studies of the determinants of the informal economy provide several insights to the study of
informality. Direct and indirect tax rates as well as stringent labor regulations are found to
be strong determinants of the variation in the size of the informal sector across countries,
although the enforcement of regulation can play an even more important role (e.g., Loayza,
3Scarpetta and Tressel (2004) suggest that this eﬀect happens through a reduction in the incentives for
innovation and new technology adoption. Other papers focus on speciﬁc changes on labor regulations or
social security payments (e.g. Heckman and Pages, 2003, Gruber, 1997, Kugler, 2001, or Kugler and Kugler,
2005).
41997, Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton, 1998a,b, Loayza, Oviedo and Serven, 2005).4
The modern micro literature on informal labor markets (e.g., Maloney, 2004) suggests that
we should look at the formal and informal sectors in an integrated way (as opposed to a
segmented view of the labor market) and emphasizes the role of the informal sector as a
source of unregulated labor to ﬁrms. This is the basis of the economic reasoning underlying
our work.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the Brazilian labor market,
the enforcement of regulation in Brazil, and a simple model that guides our empirical work.
Section 3 describes the data. In Section 4 we analyze the relationship between enforce-
ment, informal employment and ﬁrm performance. In section 5 we present estimates of the
importance of labor ﬂexibility for ﬁrm productivity and wages. Section 6 concludes.
2. Background
The Brazilian labor market has a large number of unregistered workers. According to the
Brazilian National Statistical Institute (IBGE), there were 36 million wage earners in the
private sector in 1999, 40% of which were informal workers.5 Brazil also has one of the most
highly regulated labor markets in the world.6 In a recent paper Botero, Djankov, La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003) document that Brazil has the highest score in an index
of strictness of employment law. Since we expect to ﬁnd higher levels of non-compliance
with the law in the presence of strict regulation (Loayza, Oviedo and Serven, 2005), it is not
surprising that the level of labor informality in Brazil is so high. In this section we brieﬂy
4Most of the cross country studies ﬁnd that income tax and social security burden are important de-
terminants of the informal economy. The larger is the diﬀerence between total cost of formal and informal
labor, the greater the incentive to hire informal workers (e.g., Loayza, 1997 and Reinhard, Hofreither and
Schneider, 1989). Loayza, Oviedo and Serven (2005) show that labor regulations are positively related to
the size of the informal sector but that the strength and eﬃciency of government institutions are negatively
related to it.
5Informal workers here include self-employed workers, non-paid workers and the employers and employees
in small ﬁrms. In our empirical work we deﬁne informal workers those that do not have their labor contract
registered in a work permit (we ignore self-employment).
6In the early 1980s informal workers only accounted for 30% of the workforce. During the 1990s, there
was a large increase in informality following several market oriented reforms (like privatizations and trade
liberalization) and the new federal constitution in 1988, which greatly reinforced job security regulation.
Barros and Corseuil (2001) describe the current rules governing worker’s rights and the organization of
unions.
5describe the main features of labor regulation and its enforcement in Brazil. Then we brieﬂy
discuss how we expect regulation and enforcement to aﬀect informal employment and ﬁrm
performance.
2.1. Labor Market Regulation and Enforcement in Brazil
All employees in Brazil must have a work permit (carteira de trabalho)o nw h i c ht h ee m p l o y -
ment history of the worker is registered. This permit oﬃcially entitles the worker to several
wage and non-wage beneﬁts paid for by the employer, such as retirement beneﬁts, unemploy-
ment insurance, and severance payments through access to a special fund created for this
purpose, the Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Servico (FGTS).7 The law establishes that all
employers must register new labor contracts in the employees’ permit. The employer must
also register the type of work contract, as well as all modiﬁcations to an existing contract
(including changes in the wage rate or in the period of leave).
Employers face several costs when hiring formal workers (beyond their net wage) such
as taxes and other indirect beneﬁts (payments to the FGTS, 30 days of paid leave per year,
previous notiﬁcation in case of dismissal 8 and maternity and paternity paid leave). In the
case of informal hires most of these beneﬁts are negotiated on a case-by-case basis between
the employer and the employee. Moreover, unregistered workers do not have access to un-
employment beneﬁts and severance payment. Neri (2000) argues that ﬁrms comply with
most of the worker’s rights relative to minimum wages, hours of work and other employment
7The FGTS is a government administered fund that is accumulated while the worker is employed. The
employer contributes monthly with 8% of the current wage. Therefore, the total amount in the fund in
any given period is a function of the job tenure and the wage history of the worker. Unfairly dismissed
workers have access to their entire fund, including all funds accumulated in previous jobs, plus 40% of the
employer’s cumulative contribution to the worker’s FGTS. The fact that dismissals are the only way to
obtain the FGTS and that, once dismissed, the worker immediately receives severance pay, provides strong
incentives for workers to induce dismissals whenever they want to quit. On the other hand, ﬁrms tend
to reduce dismissals when large dismissals penalties are at stake (in the case of high wage - high tenured
workers). Large ﬁring costs also imply that ﬁrms become selective in the hiring process and this tends to
reduce dismissals. Barros, Corseuil and Foguel (1999) argue that ﬁrms and workers have incentive to collude
to turn quits into dismissals. In this case, workers have access to the FGTS but ﬁrms do not have to go to
court.
8In Brazil the notiﬁcation period (i.e., period between the notice and actual dismissal) is approximately
one month. During this period, workers are given two hours per day to search for a new job. During this
period the worker’s productivity is likely to fall signiﬁcantly, but the ﬁrm still has to pay the full wage.
6practices, even for informal workers. Therefore, the major incentive for ﬁrms to hire in-
formally is to avoid mandatory payments to the government (e.g., social security payments,
FGTS contributions) which in Brazil can amount to 100% of the net wage paid to the worker
(eﬀectively doubling the cost of labor).
Compliance with labor regulation in Brazil is enforced by the Ministry of Labor. Given
the size of the country, enforcement is ﬁrst decentralized at the state level and then de-
centralized further at a more local level, which in this paper we call subregion (a detailed
description of the structure of this bureaucracy is provided in the data appendix). Each sub-
region includes several cities (municipios). The oﬃces of the Ministry of Labor in the state
and the subregion are called delegacia and subdelegacia, respectively. Labor inspectors are
aﬃliated with a particular subdelegacia and visit ﬁrms within the corresponding subregion,
assessing their compliance with several dimensions of labor law (such as worker registration,
minimum wages, FGTS, working hours or leave beneﬁts). There is an eﬀort to apply an
homogeneous criteria in the enforcement of the labor regulation throughout the country, but
in practice this is very diﬃcult to achieve.9 Enforcement is likely not to be uniform across
subregions because Brazil covers a very large and diverse geographical area, the number of
inspectors involved is also large and probably very heterogeneous in their ability and honesty
(which is important in the case inspectors are oﬀered bribes).10
When a worker is found not to be registered, or if there are changes in the wage or hours
of work of the employees that were not included in the work permit, the inspector notiﬁes the
ﬁrm of its violation. After receiving a notiﬁcation, the ﬁr mh a s1 0d a y st op r e s e n te v i d e n c e
in its defense. Because it is the ﬁrm’s responsibility to register the worker’s contract, once
notiﬁed it is very diﬃcult to prove its innocence.11 Therefore, even though a notiﬁcation
does not imply a ﬁne, in the particular case of the registration of workers, it almost always
does. A ﬁrm is ﬁned 300 Reais (USD$130) for each worker that is found unregistered during
9The Ministry of Labor provides training continuously to labor inspectors: all inspectors have a common
implementation manual and work with a similar software. At the end of 2002, there was a total of 2341
labor inspectors in Brazil.
10Up to 50% of the inspectors’ wage is tied to their performance giving them a strong incentive to penalize
all the infractions they can ﬁnd. However, there is still an incentive to collect bribes.
11Exceptions include the cases where a third party (such as a union) is responsable for the registration.
7an inspection (which can occur more than once a year) but the ﬁne is reduced by 50% if the
ﬁrm pays within 10 days of the date of notiﬁcation12 (other types of violations of the labor
code are also punishable with ﬁnes, although we do not describe them here).
In summary, Brazil has very restrictive labor market regulation, which provides strong
incentives for noncompliance on the part of ﬁrms and workers. Since law enforcement is
imperfect there is a large amount of informal employment. Furthermore, enforcement is
highly decentralized which results in substantial variation in enforcement across areas.
2.2. Informal Employment and Economic Performance: Theoretical Considera-
tions
In this paper we examine how variation in the enforcement of the law inﬂuences illegal
behavior on the part of ﬁrms and, as a result, how it aﬀects their productivity. Underlying
our empirical work is a simple model that relates enforcement of labor regulation, the demand
for informal labor and ﬁrm productivity. In this section we brieﬂyd e s c r i b es u c ham o d e l
and its implications for our empirical work.
We consider a ﬁrm choosing simultaneously two types of labor (formal and informal),
capital and the technology of production. Firms can choose diﬀerent types of technology
depending on the prices of diﬀerent inputs. Technology, capital and formal labor are quasi
ﬁxed inputs, while informal labor can be ﬂexibly adjusted every period. The additional
ﬂexibility of informal labor is due, for example, to lower hiring and ﬁring costs (Oi, 1962), or
to the lack of regulation in working hours. We assume there are no other diﬀerences between
these two types of workers (for example, diﬀerences in education or other measures of skill).
There is no distinction between formal and informal ﬁrms, but only between formal and
informal workers (our assumption is that all ﬁrms are fully registered, although part or all
of their workers may not be legally registered).
We consider informal workers to be unregulated workers who coexist with formal workers
in a single labor market, as opposed to assuming segmented labor markets.13 However,
12In the ﬁr ml e v e ld a t aw eu s ei nt h ep a p e rt h en u m b e ro fi n s p e c t i o n si naﬁrm in 2001 varies between
zero and 60. The median number of annual labor inspections is 1 and the mean is 1.33.
13Maloney (2004) (and others) argue for a uniﬁed labor market approach as opposed to a dual view of the
labor market.
8there are important diﬀerences in the monetary cost of these two types of labor. When
hiring informal workers ﬁrms can forego the payment of taxes and mandatory social security
contributions but, because they violate the law, they face potential punishment from labor
authorities.
The government enforces employment registration imperfectly because enforcement is
costly, and the degree of enforcement varies exogenously across ﬁrms (either over time, or
across diﬀerent regions). Firms which hire informal workers face the prospect of a ﬁne
(proportional to the amount of hired informal labor) with some probability, which is a
function of the characteristics of the ﬁrm and its eﬀorts to avoid regulation. For example
large ﬁrms, or ﬁrms with a large percentage of public capital are more visible to labor
authorities (e.g., Loayza, 1997). Therefore, ﬁrms hiring informal workers are likely to be
small.14
For simplicity, we do not distinguish the role of the probability of being caught from the
size of the ﬁn e . W ea s s u m et h a tﬁrms face a cost of hiring informal workers which varies
with the degree of enforcement of the regulation. As enforcement increases so does this cost,
and therefore the amount of informal workers hired decreases. Furthermore, when the cost
of access to unregulated workers increases (due to increased enforcement) the ﬂexibility of
the ﬁrm’s labor force decreases, and the price of labor increases.
Firms may respond to increased enforcement in several ways. For example, they may
choose capital intensive technologies when enforcement is strict (avoiding large labor costs)
and labor intensive technologies when enforcement is loose (Loayza, 1997). Alternatively,
whenever enforcement is loose, ﬁrms can choose technologies that are more productive when
labor is ﬂexible, and these can be either labor intensive or capital intensive. For example,
Besley and Burgess (2003) ﬁnd that pro-worker labor regulation in India (which makes labor
more expensive) leads to lower investment. They also ﬁnd that it leads to lower labor
productivity.
In principle we would expect total employment to increase when enforcement is less strict
14We do not consider bribes to labor inspectors although they could be easily incorporated as a form of
ﬁne. Stigma eﬀects due to bad publicity to the ﬁrm can also be incorporated as a form of ﬁne.
9(although this depends in part on the choice of technology). In fact, it is often argued that
an important beneﬁt of deregulation is increased employment: workers forego job security
for higher employment. However, employment eﬀects can be quantitatively small.15 In
fact, when labor regulation became more restrictive in Brazil there were only small eﬀects
on employment, as reported by Barros and Corseuil (2001). In the presence of reduced
enforcement, if all ﬁrms substitute formal by informal workers then there will be no change
in employment. Still, there could exist large changes in ﬁrm performance, especially if the
substitution of formal by informal workers leads to a reduction in the ﬁrm’s labor costs.
Net wages may increase if the ﬁrm is more productive, but gross labor costs will probably
fall since the ﬁrm is paying less to social security. Net average wages may also increase if
informal workers earn more than formal workers (keeping worker characteristics ﬁxed). This
w i l lb et h ec a s ei fﬁrms share with informal workers the savings in social security payments
they get by hiring them.16 In the empirical work that follows we examine how enforcement
aﬀects the ﬁrm’s employment of informal workers, and how it subsequently aﬀects total
employment, wages, productivity and investment.
3. Data
Descriptive statistics of the main variables that we use in the analysis are reported in ap-
pendix table A1. The source of ﬁrm level data is the Investment Climate survey collected
by the World Bank. The survey is representative of a set of manufacturing sectors that
together account for 75% of the manufacturing value added and employment in 2002 (details
of the survey are given in the data appendix). In the collection of this dataset the World
Bank worked with a private survey ﬁrm. Given the detail and the sensitive nature of some
15For example, if ﬁrms change their technology then the demand for labor schedule changes and employ-
ment can increase or decrease, depending on whether the new technology is more or less labor intensive.
Furthermore, assume that the wage of informal workers plus the potential penalty cost from hiring them is
approximately equal to the net wage of formal workers plus social security costs, so that total labor costs
with each type of worker are the same. Then, instead of a change in employment, ﬁrms may just choose to
substitute formal for informal workers.
16This is usually labeled as “ﬁscal kink” (or cunha ﬁscal). Given that the total labor costs of formal
workers greatly exceed their net wage, there is a strong incentive for ﬁrms to hire informally and for workers
to be hired informally, if the savings from such an exercise (unpaid social security beneﬁts) can be shared
between both parties.
10of the questions the survey was designed to be answered by the ﬁrm’s manager. The typical
observation is based on a three-hour interview which often implied two visits to the ﬁrm to
accommodate the manager’s time schedule. This resulted in a sample of 1641 ﬁrms with in-
formation on several characteristics of the ﬁrm, such as total employment, sales, value added,
labor costs, capital stock, share of high educated workers, share of workers with training,
age of the ﬁrm and share of foreign and public ownership. These ﬁrms are located across 306
cities (77 subregions) in Brazil. The survey also collects information on the number of labor
inspections in each ﬁr ma n dw h e t h e ri th a dt op a ya n yﬁnes or bribes. Of particular interest
to us is information about the degree of labor informality in the ﬁrm. Even though every
ﬁrm in our sample is legally registered there are some ﬁrms that employ informal workers.
The survey collects indirect information on the use of informal labor through the fol-
lowing question: “Given the constraints to hire workers and the additional costs that it
entails, in your opinion, what is the percentage of the permanent employment that is in-
formal/unregistered in a typical ﬁrm of this size and in this industry?”.17 The question is
phrased indirectly to avoid implicating the respondent in any wrongdoing. Throughout the
paper we will assume the answer to be a good indicator of the ﬁrm’s own degree of labor
informality. Still, many of our empirical results relating enforcement and ﬁrm performance
do not depend on the use of this variable.
Even though similar questions have been used successfully in the study of corruption
(Svensson, 2003), there can be doubts about the extent to which the answer to this question
measures the degree of informality of the respondent ﬁrm. Several arguments support our
use of this variable, although none of them is deﬁnitive. First, ﬁrms are also asked to judge
to what degree similar ﬁrms generally comply with labor law. We ﬁnd that 41% of the
ﬁrms simultaneously claim that their competitors comply perfectly with labor law and state
that similar ﬁrms hire a positive percentage of informal workers. Such responses would
be inconsistent unless ﬁrms that were similar to the respondent ﬁrm were not its major
competitors (which is unlikely), or if the answer to the question on informal employment
17The survey also collects information on the share of temporary workers. However, since in our data
temporary employment is negligible we focus only on permanent workers.
11really corresponded to the degree of informality of the respondent and not of a group of
similar ﬁrms (which we take to be the case). Second, ﬁrms also report their labor costs,
inclusive of a variety of taxes and social security payments. We observe that ﬁrms employing
informal workers pay on average 61% lower taxes and social security payments per employee
than those only hiring legal workers (according to our deﬁnition). Even after controlling
for industry, location and average net wage in the ﬁrm, the formal-informal diﬀerential in
social security payments and taxes is still 17%. If the answer to the question above were
not related to the percentage of informal workers employed by the respondent ﬁrm this
relationship would probably not take this form so clearly. Third, ﬁrms are asked whether
they would like to change their workforce if they had no hiring or ﬁring costs. We ﬁnd that
those ﬁrms that report that they would like to change their workforce (either increase or
decrease) are 20 percentage points more likely to report using informal labor.18 In other
words, under our interpretation, ﬁrms facing stronger labor market constraints are more
likely to employ informal workers. Fourth, the manager of the ﬁrm is asked to rank the
importance of diﬀerent obstacles to the ﬁrm’s growth. In particular, managers have to rank
the following barriers to business (among others) from 0 (no obstacle) to 4 (severe obstacle),
among others: telecommunications, electricity, taxes, export regulations, labor regulations,
corruption, crime, anti-competitive practices. We ﬁnd that managers who report that labor
regulations are a severe obstacle are more likely to report employment of informal workers.19
1869% of the ﬁrms that say that they would like to change their workforce report a positive share of
informal workers while only 49% of the ﬁrms that say they would like to remain with the same number of
workers reports a positive share of informal workers.
19While 70% of the ﬁrms reporting that labor regulations as a severe obstacle report also labor informality,
only 52% of the ﬁrms reporting that labor regulations are not an obstacle also report labor informality.
H o w e v e r ,b o t ha r g u m e n t s3a n d4c a nb es e e ni nr e v e r s ea sw e l l :i tw o u l db ep o s s i b l et h a tﬁrms who report
that they would not like to change their workforce, or that they are not constrained by labor regulations,
are precisely the ones with the highest amount of informal workers. Because they employ unregulated labor,
they do not feel constrained. We also observe that approximately 10% of the ﬁrms do not provide answers
for the informality question, but still report data for sales, capital and other inputs. The missing data raises
questions relative to possible sample selection. To address this issue, we check whether ﬁrms with missing
information also decline answering other questions that also would implicate them in wrongdoing. We ﬁnd
no evidence that ﬁrms avoid all wrongdoing questions. In particular, the survey asks an indirect question
on the share of the total sales reported for tax purposes. About 70% of the ﬁrms that do not answer the
question on labor informality, do answer the question on (indirect) tax evasion. Furthermore, ﬁrms that do
not report data on informal workers are not statistically diﬀerent from ﬁrms that report this information
on a variety of dimensions (results available upon request). This evidence suggests that our sample is not
12Table 1 presents diﬀerences (across a variety of dimensions) between ﬁrms reporting a
positive number of informal workers and ﬁrms reporting no use of such workers in our sample.
T h en u m b e r si nt h et a b l ea r et h ec o e ﬃcients of a regression of diﬀerent ﬁrm characteristics
on a dummy variable that equals one if the ﬁrm reports using informal workers. Column (1)
includes no other controls in the regression, while in column (2) we control for sector dummies
and some regional characteristics.20 Approximately 65% of the ﬁrms report using some full
time informal workers. For these ﬁrms, on average informal workers represent approximately
36% of the permanent workforce. These ﬁrms are on average younger and smaller in terms of
total employment, physical capital, value added, and proﬁts than those reporting no informal
employment, they have a less educated workforce and are less likely to provide formal on-
the-job formal training to their workers. They are also less likely to be foreign or state owned
than fully legal ﬁrms, they tend to be concentrated in low skilled/labor intensive sectors (like
clothing, shoes and wood products) and are less likely to work in chemicals, machinery and
electronic products.21 Finally, ﬁrms employing informal workers report being more likely to
pay bribes to labor oﬃcials (conditional on having been inspected) and are also more likely
to underreport their sales for tax purposes than ﬁrms only hiring formal workers.22
We combine this ﬁrm level dataset with administrative data collected by the Ministry of
Labor in 2002 on the number of regional oﬃces that exist within each subregion23,n u m b e r
of inspected ﬁrms and the number of ﬁnes issued in each city (more details are given in the
data appendix). We have information on the number of ﬁnes for diﬀerent labor violations:
selective.
20We estimate an equation of the following form: yj = βDIj + γsDs +  j,w h e r eyj is the outcome of
interest, DIj is a dummy variable that equals one if the ﬁrm reports using informal workers, Ds are sector
dummies and Zr are regional characteristics at the subregional level (total number of plants, population in
2002, log GDP in 1985, log population in 1991 and share of females).
21In our sample, these sectors are more likely to have a certiﬁcate of quality and are more likely to develop
internally and /or jointly with costumers or suppliers new technology. These sectors also have more educated
workers (40% of the workers have more than the bachelor degree vs 31% for the median in the sample) and
higher wages.
22Firms that report using informal workers are also less likely to be exporters, to have quality certiﬁcation
of their products and to be licensed to use foreign technology than other ﬁrms not employing informal workers
(results not reported in table 1)
23The Ministry of Labor has regional oﬃces in selected cities of each subregion. These oﬃces are not
decision units like the subdelegacias, but are designed for increasing the access of the public to the Ministry
of Labor.
13registration ﬁnes,a r eﬁnes related with the ﬁrm not registering the worker for a work permit,
work load ﬁnes are ﬁnes related with the ﬁrm not complying with the oﬃcial work load, wage
ﬁnes are ﬁnes related with the ﬁrm not paying the minimum established by the law, hours
of work ﬁnes are ﬁnes related with the ﬁrm not complying with the number of hours of
work and the mandatory pauses, FGTS ﬁnes are ﬁnes related with the ﬁrm not making
the mandatory discounts to the FGTS, transport subsidy ﬁnes are ﬁnes related with ﬁrm
not paying the mandatory transport subsidy, and other ﬁnes are ﬁnes related with other
mandatory obligations of the ﬁrm to their workers. We construct the total labor ﬁnes,a s
the sum of all these diﬀerent ﬁnes. This data was aggregated from city to subregion level
using information provided by the Ministry of Labor on all the cities that belong to each
subdelegacia.
Finally, we also use information from two Brazilian statistical and research institutes
(IPEA and IBGE). Data for population and for the total number of plants in 2002 is col-
lected by the National Statistics Institute (IBGE). City level data for GDP (1985 and 2000),
population (1991 and 2000), share of females (2000), geographical area (2000), transporta-
tion costs to the nearest capital city (1995), number of train stations in the city (1995) and
homicide rate per 100000 inhabitants (2002) is collected by the Instituto de Pesquisa Eco-
nomica Aplicada (IPEA). These variables are all observed at the city level and are aggregate
to the level of the subregion.
4. Enforcement of Regulation, Informal Labor and Firm Perfor-
mance
4.1. Main Results
In this section we examine the eﬀect of enforcement of labor regulation on informal employ-
ment hired by the ﬁr ma n do nv a r i o u sﬁrm outcomes. We estimate a set of relationships
based on the following equation:
Yj = α + βEj + Xjγ + εj (4.1)
14where Yj is the either the proportion of informal workers in ﬁrm j’s total employment or a
measure of ﬁrm performance (log value added per worker, log average wage, log sales per
worker, log proﬁt per worker, log capital per worker, log total employment and a dummy
variable indicating use of advanced technologies), Ej is enforcement of regulation faced by
ﬁrm j,24 Xj is a vector of exogenous variables and εj is a i.i.d. error term.25
As described in the previous section, enforcement of labor regulation in Brazil is decen-
tralized at the level of the subdelegacia (subregion). This is the relevant level of variation
for the enforcement data. We have administrative data on the number of labor inspections
a n do nt h en u m b e ro fﬁnes issued in each subregion. We prefer to use labor ﬁnes rather
than labor inspections as a measure of enforcement because we can discriminate ﬁnes by
type of violation whereas we cannot discriminate inspections by type of oﬀense (because
inspections are general). In particular, we know the number of ﬁnes related speciﬁcally to
irregularities that concern worker registration, registration ﬁnes.T h i si su l t i m a t e l yt h ee n -
forcement measure that is most relevant for ﬁrms when deciding to evade (or not) the law
and hire informally. Because some subregions are larger and have more ﬁrms than others,
we normalize number of ﬁnes by number of ﬁrms in the subregion.26
A priori we expect β to be negative when Yj is informal employment, but as we suggest
in section (2.2) β can be either negative or positive in the case of all other outcomes. We
hope that our measure of enforcement is reasonably exogenous, and varies due to arbitrary
diﬀerences in inspections across regions. However, for several reasons, it may happen that
24We use contemporaneous measures of enforcement instead of lagged measures of enforcement. This is
because the current available data on enforcement is only for 2002. We do not believe this aﬀects the results
in our paper.
25I nt h ec a s ew h e r eYj is the proportion of informal workers hired by the ﬁrm, equation (4.1) is not an
explicit labor demand equation but can be related to it in a partial equilibrium framework, where the prices
of diﬀerent inputs are kept ﬁxed when enforcement varies across ﬁrms. However, a labor demand equation
would have the number of informal workers employed by the ﬁrm on the left hand side instead of the
proportion of informal workers in total employment. Our empirical results are similar when we use number
of informal workers as our dependent variable in this regression (available on request). A similar reasoning
applies when Yj is total employment in the ﬁrm or capital per worker. In the case where Yj corresponds to
ﬁrm outcomes such as sales per worker or value added per worker, we do not estimate explicit production
functions. However, the (reduced form) relationship we estimate between ﬁrm outcomes and enforcement of
laws can be derived from a standard proﬁt maximization problem with multiple types of labor which have
diﬀerent ﬂexibility and diﬀerent costs. It is also similar to the speciﬁcation of Besley and Burgess (2003)
and of other papers in the literature on labor regulation and economic performance.
26In practice, we will use total number of ﬁnes per 1000 ﬁrms in the subregion.
15Ej is correlated with the error term in each of the equations we estimate, biasing simple
OLS estimates of β. For example, subregions diﬀer in characteristics (either at the ﬁrm or
more aggregate level) that determine potential informality, i.e. the degree of informality that
would exist if there were no enforcement. In some areas, ﬁrms are more prone to engage
in informal behavior sand as a consequence enforcement will also be higher. The positive
correlation between informality and enforcement is similar to the argument that “more crime
leads to more police” (Levitt, 1997, 2002). This “reverse causality” is likely to cause the
estimate of β to be upward biased when the dependent variable is informal employment. It
causes β to be upward biased as well in the productivity regressions if in areas with more
potential informality ﬁrms operate more eﬃciently (because they use unregulated labor).
β will be downward biased in productivity regressions if ﬁrms located in areas with more
potential informality are also less productive (due to the type of ﬁrms they are, and industry
they belong to).
It may also happen that larger ﬁrms with smaller amounts of informal workers locate
in large cities where institutions are better and inspections are more rigorous, while smaller
ﬁrms are located in less developed areas. This will induce a negative correlation between
enforcement and informal behavior, leading to a downward bias in β when Yj corresponds
to informal employment. However, it is likely to lead to an upward bias in β when Yj is ﬁrm
productivity. Similarly, ﬁrms wishing to hire informal workers may sort into areas where
enforcement is less strict, again causing bias in the estimate of β.
We would like to isolate variation in enforcement due to arbitrary severity of inspectors or
costs of enforcement uncorrelated with potential informality, from variation in enforcement
due to potential informality in the regions, endogenous sorting of ﬁrms or third factors
correlated with both enforcement and informality. In order to do this we start by controlling
for an extensive set of variables at the level of the ﬁrm, city and subregion. Our ﬁrm level
controls are industry, age of the ﬁrm and share of foreign ownership. These variables are
likely to be good indicators of the level of potential informality of the ﬁrm and are also
likely to be fairly exogenous.27 Our subregion level controls include number of plants and
27We do not control for employment, capital intensity or productivity (when we do not use such variables
16number of individuals, share of females, log GDP in 1985 and log population in 1991 in the
subregion. The latter two are included as a control for past per capita GDP in the area,
which is likely to be a good predictor of current enforcement, and also a good predictor of
potential informality.28 The other variables play a similar role. We include an additional
variable at the subregion level, which measures the number of total labor ﬁnes per 1000
ﬁrms in the subregion. This is a measure of general enforcement of labor law (as opposed to
speciﬁc enforcement of worker registration) which is likely to be correlated with the level of
general illegal behavior in the subregion and also with its level of development, for reasons
already discussed. We assume that, conditional on these characteristics, the variation in
enforcement is exogenous to the ﬁrm.
We are fairly conﬁdent this is a valid assumption and start by presenting the results
for this speciﬁcation. However, in the next section we provide some speciﬁcation checks as
well as several instrumental variable estimates, where our instruments for enforcement are
measures of access of inspectors to the cities in their subregion (number of train stations,
average area of a city and number of smaller delegations of the Ministry of Labor in the
subregion29) and a measure of general law enforcement in the subregion (homicide rate30).
We will show that our results are robust to the inclusion of diﬀerent sets of controls, and to
accounting for endogeneity using our various instruments.
Table 2 presents the main results of the paper. Each column shows the least square
estimate of β (from equation (4.1)) for each dependent variable we consider, conditioning
on the controls described above. We cluster the standard errors by subregion to account for
the fact that enforcement varies at this level while our dependent variables vary at the ﬁrm
level (some of the remaining controls vary at the level of the ﬁrm and others at the level of
as dependent variables) because they are all endogeneous variables.
28We include them separately because we could not ﬁnd data on population levels per city in 1985, which
would allow us to construct per capita GDP per city in 1985.
29The idea is that costly access to cities decreases the amount of inspections and ﬁnes faced by ﬁrms
without being correlated with the error term in the regression. We control for transporation costs to the
nearest capital since access to a region and development are likely to be correlated. The inclusion of this
variable does not make much diﬀerent for our estimates.
30The idea is that the homicide rate is correlated with the level of general law enforcement in the region
and does not directly aﬀect our outcomes of interest. Furthermore, we assume that general law enforcement
and enforcement of labor law are positively correlated.
17the subregion).
The ﬁrst column of the table shows that stricter enforcement of labor regulation strongly
aﬀects the demand for informal labor by ﬁrms.31 Therefore, enforcement is a tool that
can potentially be used by governments to eﬀectively ﬁght noncompliance with the law.
We estimate that, on average, when the number of ﬁnes per 1000 ﬁrms in the subregion
increases by 1, the share of informal workers falls by 3.5 percentage points. In our sample,
the average number of ﬁnes per 1000 ﬁrms in the subregion is 0.77 and the average proportion
of informal workers in a ﬁrm is 0.23. Based on these numbers we compute that an elasticity
of illegal employment with respect to enforcement of -0.12. This number is comparable to
those obtained in the crime deterrence literature using US data: for example, Levitt (1998)
ﬁnds that the elasticity of crime with respect to the arrest rate is about -0.2, and Bar-Ilan
and Sacerdote (2004) ﬁnd that the elasticity of driving violations with respect to ﬁn e si sa l s o
about -0.2. However, average enforcement of labor regulation is low and the average amount
of violations is relatively high in our sample, so that an elasticity of -0.12 corresponds to a
large absolute eﬀect of ﬁnes on illegal behavior.
Given the strength of the eﬀect of enforcement on informality, we are likely to also ﬁnd
eﬀects on productivity as well. Columns (2) to (5) of table 2 show that weaker enforcement of
labor regulation is associated with higher ﬁrm productivity as measured by value added per
worker, average wages, sales per worker and proﬁts per worker. Furthermore, it is interesting
that weaker enforcement is also associated with higher investment in capital and technology.
This suggests that labor productivity increases because the ﬁrm operates more eﬃciently
and the capital stock is higher. We estimate that an increase in 1 in the number of ﬁnes per
31Due to the unusual nature of our dependent variable and to the way the question is asked in the
survey we may be concerned with measurement error. Measurement error in the dependent variable is not
usually a problem, unless it is correlated with the independent variable of interest. In particular, ﬁrms may
underreport informal behavior when they are faced with strict enforcement, in which case the coeﬃcient of
interest captures the eﬀect of enforcement on both informal behavior and miss reporting and therefore is
an overestimate of the true deterrent eﬀect of enforcement. Even though we cannot address this concern
in our paper we have replicated our results using a transformation of our dependent variable: a dummy
w h i c ht a k e st h ev a l u e0i ft h eﬁrm reports no illegal employment and the value 1 if the ﬁrm reports any
informal employment, although there is no way to say whether this transformation exarcebates or dampens
the potential measurement error problem. Our results are essentially the same but some of the standard
errors in our instrumental variables speciﬁcations in the next section are larger. These results are available
on request.
181000 ﬁrms in the subregion leads to a reduction of 12.5% in value added per employee (which
means that the elasticity of productivity with respect to enforcement is approximately 0.1).
The absence of discernible eﬀects on total employment is rather surprising. When faced
with the possibility of hiring informal workers ﬁrms decide not to change the size of their
labor force, in spite of lower labor costs. Instead, they increase their investment and change
their technology (the technological change changes the demand for labor, and in our case it
seems to reduce it). They just substitute away from formal workers and towards informal
workers. In this instance, increased labor market ﬂexibility does not produce strong eﬀects
on employment, but in spite of that (this section shows that) labor market ﬂexibility can
have a substantial impact on the economy. In fact, our ﬁnding is somewhat consistent with
Barros and Corseuil (2001) who ﬁnd very small eﬀects on employment of tighter labor market
regulation due to the 1988 constitutional change (although they do not examine other ﬁrm
outcomes).32 It is quite possible that there are small eﬀects on employment and large eﬀects
on other ﬁrm outcomes.33 Our ﬁndings illustrate the importance of looking at multiple
outcomes of the ﬁrm.
4.2. Robustness and Endogeneity
Our estimates are quite robust to several changes in the speciﬁcation. Table 3 reports
the least squares estimates of equation (4.1) using as dependent variable the proportion of
informal employment. In column (1) we include only enforcement in the regression. The
eﬀect of enforcement on informal employment is strongly negative.34 Our estimates of β in
column (1) will be an underestimate of the true eﬀect if more enforcement is caused by more
informality (reverse causality), and it will be an overestimate if strong enforcement and low
informality are caused by a third factor, such as strong institutions and strong civic culture
32Gruber (1997) also ﬁnds small eﬀects of social security provisions on employment using data from Chile.
33Even though the eﬀect of enforcement on employment is not large, enforcement has an eﬀect on the
reported desire of the ﬁrm to change its labor force. Firms are asked whether they would change the size of
their labor force if they could hire and ﬁre with no restrictions. In results available on request we ﬁnd that
an increase in our measure of enforcement in 1 unit leads to an increase of 4% in the probability that the
ﬁrm reports a desire to change the labor force in the absence of hiring or ﬁring constraints.
34Using labor inspections as an enforcement measure does not produce such a strong negative correlation
as using ﬁnes (available on request).
19(omitted variables) or if there is sorting. In column (2), we include in the regression controls
for diﬀerences across subregions in other characteristics that were omitted and that are likely
to be relevant for informality and also for enforcement (GDP per capita, population, number
of ﬁrms, average years of schooling and share of females). In column (3) we control for age of
the ﬁrm, share of public ownership in the ﬁrm and industry dummies. In column (4) we add
a control for the total number of labor related ﬁnes per 1000 ﬁrms in the subregion, which is
meant to capture the general severity of labor inspectors in the region. Finally, in columns
(5) and (6) we include additional controls at the city and at the ﬁrm level.35 Across columns
the eﬀect of enforcement on employment of informal workers is strong and negative.
We are conﬁdent that the variation in enforcement in our preferred speciﬁcation (column
4) is fairly exogenous. Enforcement is likely not to be uniform across subregions because
Brazil covers a very large and diverse geographical area, the number of inspectors involved
is also large and most importantly very heterogeneous in their ability and honesty (which
is important in the case inspectors are oﬀered bribes). However, there may remain some
concerns that cov(E,εj|X)  =0so we also present a discussion of possible instruments for
the number of informality ﬁnes per ﬁrm in equation (4.1). We conjecture that some variables
that capture the costs of enforcement of regulation are uncorrelated with the ﬁrm’s decision
to hire informal workers except through the extent of enforcement in the subregion. Three of
the variables that we propose as instruments measure access of inspectors to diﬀerent cities
within the subregion: the number of train stations in the subregion, average area of a city in
the subregion (in thousands of squared kilometers), number of regional oﬃces of the Ministry
of Labor in the subregion. The better the access of inspectors to the cities, the lower will
be the costs of enforcing the regulation. Still, one may argue that these three variables can
be correlated with the performance of the ﬁrm because they also measure access to markets,
especially the ﬁrst variable. In order to account for this we include as a control variable an
index of the transportation cost to the nearest state capital, which can either be within the
35I fi n s t e a do ft h es h a r eo fi n f o r m a lw o r k e r si nt h eﬁrm we use as dependent variable a dummy variable
that equals one if the ﬁrm employs any informal workers, we obtain the same patterns (results available on
request). The only diﬀerence is that the eﬀect corresponding to the one reported on column (2) of table 2 is
not signiﬁcant (but it is still negative). However, all other eﬀects are negative and strongly signiﬁcant.
20state or in a neighboring state. This is a relevant variable for measuring access to markets
but not for measuring access from labor inspectors, who operate only within state at the
level of the subregion.36 Finally, we also propose using as instrument a measure of general
enforcement of law in the subregion: average number of homicides per 100000 inhabitants in
t h ec i t i e so ft h es u b r e g i o n .Ap r i o r i ,t h e r ei sn or e a s o nf o rt h eh o m i c i d er a t et ob ec o r r e l a t e d
with informal behavior of the ﬁrm except through third factors that are correlated with
general enforcement of the law in the subregion and may also aﬀect the enforcement of labor
law.37
The results of estimating equation (4.1) with instrumental variables are presented in table
4.I ne a c hc o l u m nw ei n s t r u m e n tr e g i s t r a t i o nﬁnes with diﬀerent combinations of instruments
controlling for transportation costs to the nearest capital. Below each instrumental variables
speciﬁcation we present the F-Statistic for a test of whether the instruments are strong in the
ﬁrst stage regression along with the corresponding P-Value, and the P-Value of a Sargan test
of overidentiﬁcation (which we never reject). The results in the table show that the coeﬃcient
on enforcement is always strong and negative and, if anything, of larger magnitude than the
one in column (1). Because the variable number of train stations is our best measure of
access to wider markets, and therefore the most problematic to defend as a valid instrument,
we exclude it in columns (4) and (5).38 Our results suggest that, if anything, our preferred
speciﬁcation in column (4) of table 3 of the eﬀect of enforcement on informal employment is
a conservative estimate.
36This control variable is more relevant in the case where we examine the eﬀect of ﬁnes on the performance
of the ﬁrm.
37Total labor ﬁnes can also be seen as a measure of general law enforcement in the subregion. However,
we cannot exclude total labor ﬁnes from the main regression of interest since total labor ﬁnes may also have
a direct eﬀect on the demand of informal labor, by potentially aﬀecting the costs of hiring both formal and
informal workers. In fact we believe it is better if we use it as a control variable.
38In table A2 in the appendix we study the determinants of ﬁnes by regressing registration ﬁnes by
subregion on subregion controls, including only one observation per subregion (as opposed to weighting by
the number of ﬁrms in the subregion in the sample). The main determinants of this type of ﬁnes are the
instrumental variables we use above, log GDP in 1985 (with a negative sign) and total number of labor ﬁnes
in the subregion (with a positive sign). As shown in column (4)o ft a b l e3 (our preferred speciﬁcation) GDP
is also negatively related to ﬁr ml e v e li n f o r m a l i t ya n dt o t a ll a b o rﬁnes are positively related to ﬁrm level
informality, suggesting that reverse causality bias may be more important than third factor bias. Our IV
results suggest the same thing since IV coeﬃcients are larger in magnitude than OLS coeﬃcients. If this is
the case, if anything our preferred estimate is probably an underestimate of the eﬀect of informality ﬁnes on
informal employment.
21It is also likely that diﬀerent types of informal behavior are correlated at the ﬁrm level. We
checked whether enforcement of legal employment was correlated with other types of illegal
behavior. In column (1) of table 5 we present the results of a regression of the percentage
of sales not reported by the ﬁrm to tax authorities on enforcement of formal employment,
controlling for the same variables as in column (4) of table 3. We ﬁnd no evidence of a
strong eﬀect of this type of enforcement on tax evasion.39 Similarly, if the enforcement of
diﬀerent types of labor regulation are correlated, then both the dependent and independent
variables could be capturing other types of informal behavior or other types of ﬁnes. We
checked whether enforcement of other labor regulations were correlated with the prevalence
of informal employment. In columns (2) to (7) of table 5 we report the eﬀect of enforcement
of diﬀerent types of labor regulation on legal employment. We show that the strongest and
clearest eﬀect comes through the registration ﬁnes, and not through the other ﬁnes reported
here. These two sets of results suggest that we are doing a good job isolating the relationship
between the formal employment enforcement and the prevalence of formal employment.40
Table 6 looks at a measure of productivity: log value added per employee. In column (1)
we show that labor productivity and enforcement are negatively correlated. When we include
subregion and ﬁrm controls in columns (2) to (4) the coeﬃcient remains negative. Finally, in
column (5) we include city level controls and in column (6) we further add ﬁrm level controls
that are likely to be endogenous, and which are positively correlated with productivity. The
coeﬃcient on registration ﬁnes remains large in absolute value and statistically strong.41
Instrumental variables estimates are presented in table 7. Except in the case where
we include the homicide rate in the set of instruments, our estimates of the eﬀect of ﬁnes
on ﬁrm productivity are negative and statistically strong, and if anything, they are larger
39Again, the amount of tax evasion is self reported by the ﬁrm and therefore is also subject to measurement
error. However, in results available on request, we show that ﬁrms reporting a smaller fraction of sales for
tax purposes also employ more informal workers, are smaller and less produtive than ﬁrms who report a
large fraction of sales to tax authorities. This indicates that this variables has important informative value.
40Table A3 tests the robustness of the eﬀect of enforcement of regulation on the use of informal labor by
ﬁrms, using alternative measures of enforcement of registration ﬁnes. Again, we ﬁnd negative and signiﬁcant
eﬀects that are robust across the alternative measures.
41In Appendix B we show under what conditions we can get upper and lower bounds for the true value of
the parameter of interest from the numbers in table 3.
22in magnitude than our original estimate. This suggests again that, if anything, ours is a
conservative estimate of the eﬀect of enforcement on ﬁrm performance.
If enforcement of worker registration through ﬁnes is correlated with enforcement of
other labor practices then we may be capturing the eﬀect of the latter rather than the
eﬀect of the former on informal employment of ﬁrms. In appendix table A4 we examine
the eﬀect of diﬀerent types of ﬁnes on ﬁrm productivity, using our preferred speciﬁcation
o ft h em o d e lw h e r ew ei n c l u d eﬁrm controls, subregion controls and total labor ﬁnes in the
subregion. Once again the results suggest that our estimates are not confounding the role of
registration ﬁnes with the role of other types of ﬁnes.42 Finally, table A5 tests the robustness
of the eﬀect of enforcement of regulation computing alternative measures of enforcement of
registration ﬁn e s .T h en e g a t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant eﬀect is robust across the alternative measures
of enforcement. In sum, enforcement of regulation has a strong and robust eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s
value added per worker.43
5. Labor Flexibility and Firm Performance
In section 4 we showed that stricter enforcement of worker registration leads to lower em-
ployment of informal workers. We also showed that stricter enforcement led to worse ﬁrm
outcomes, and we argued that this was due to a reduction in the ﬁrms’ access to ﬂexible
labor. Drawing on the last two sections, here we present estimates of the eﬀect of labor
ﬂexibility on ﬁrm performance.
We start by focusing on two measures of ﬁrm performance: log value added per employee
and log net average wage. A simple way to calculate the eﬀect of labor ﬂexibility on ﬁrm
performance is to divide the coeﬃcient on informality ﬁnes from the performance regressions
42Apart from registration ﬁnes, only transportation subsidy ﬁnes (employers in Brazil are obligated to
subsidize public transportation of some of their workers) and a residual category of ﬁnes are negatively
correlated with value added per employee. Notice that the eﬀect of mandatory contribution ﬁnes (applied
when ﬁrms do not pay the required amount to social security) on ﬁrm’s performance has the “wrong” sign,
but that in this regression the measure of total labor ﬁn e sh a sas t r o n gn e g a t i v ee ﬀect on performance which
suggests that the roles of the variables switch. In the last column of the table we include the three variables
in the regression simultaneously and we observe that, if anything, the coeﬃcient on informality ﬁnes becomes
even more negative.
43For the sake of brevity, we only present a robustness analysis for this performance variable. Similar
analyses for the remaining dependent variables are available on request.
23of section 4 by the analogous coeﬃcient from the informality regressions. Taking our pre-
ferred speciﬁcation, the parameters of interest are -3.48 for informal employment, -0.125 for
log value added per employee and -0.045 for log wage (see table 2). Therefore, an increase in
the proportion of informal employment by 1 percentage point leads to an increase in produc-
tivity of 3.59% (and since the proportion of illegal workers in the average ﬁrm in the sample
is 23% this corresponds to an elasticity of productivity with respect to informal employment
of 0.83) and an increase in wages of 1.29% (corresponding to an elasticity of 0.3). Taking the
highest estimate for the eﬀect of registration ﬁnes on informal labor from the instrumental
variable speciﬁcations in table 4 (which is -6.28) and the lowest estimate of the eﬀect of
registration ﬁnes on value added, from table 6 (which is -0.1), an increase in the proportion
of informal employment by 1 percentage point leads to a decrease in productivity of 1.59%
(corresponding to an elasticity of 0.37). The corresponding estimate for wages is -0.04544,
which means that an increase in the proportion of informal employment by 1 percentage
points leads to an increase in wages of 0.7% (an elasticity of 0.16). All of these are large in
magnitude suggesting that labor ﬂexibility has very strong eﬀects on ﬁrm performance.
An alternative way to compute these parameters is to estimate a regression of measures
of performance on the ﬁrm’s informal employment instrumenting informality with enforce-
ment.45 In table 8 we present OLS and IV regressions of the eﬀect of the proportion of
informal workers hired by the ﬁrm on the diﬀerent measures of ﬁrm performance (log value
44The corresponding table for the IV estimates for the log average wage are not reported but are available
on request.
45Even if ﬁrm level informality is measured with error, we are instrumenting the variable which should be
enough to eliminate bias in the coeﬃcient of interest, as long as measurement error is classical. However,
measurement error may be not classical in our case. On one end, informal employment is bounded below
by zero which may introduce a negative correlation between the true value of the variable and measurement
error. On the other end, it is possible to think of several diﬀerent ways in which respondents decided to answer
the informality question and which would lead to non-classical measurement error. For example, in the case
where fully legal ﬁr m sa l w a y st o l dt h et r u t ha n ds o m eo ft h eﬁrms employing illegal workers underreported
their informal employment there would be a negative correlation between measurement error and the true
value of the variable. It may also happen that, since the exact phrasing of the question requires an answer
about other ﬁrms and not about ones ﬁrm, fully legal ﬁrms report a positive value for the informality variable
because some of its major competitors do employ informal workers, again generating a negative correlation
between the report and the true value of the variable. Finally, we have already mentioned that measurement
error may be negatively correlated with the instrument if ﬁrms underreport more in areas where enforcement
is stricter. Unfortunately, it is not possible to predict which of these arguments is more important and what
is the resulting sign of the bias.
24added per employee, log wage per employee, log sales per employee, log proﬁts per employee,
log capital per employee, log total employment and technology dummy). As expected (from
our results in table 1) the OLS estimates are both negative, and (as expected from table 2)
the IV estimates are positive and large. For example, an increase in the fraction of employed
informal workers by 1 percentage point leads to an increase in productivity of 3.5% (an
elasticity of 0.81) and an increase in wages of 1.7% (an elasticity of 0.39).
6. Conclusion
This paper has two main themes. First, we study the incentives ﬁrms face to employ informal
workers. In particular, we study the role of enforcement of labor regulation (in the form
of labor inspections and labor ﬁnes) on the behavior of ﬁrms. Second, we analyze how
enforcement of formal employment aﬀects ﬁrm performance. Stricter enforcement reduces
the access of ﬁrms to unregulated labor and can damage their productivity by increasing labor
costs. Using a combination of ﬁrm level data on illegal employment and ﬁrm performance,
and administrative data on enforcement of regulation, we show that law enforcement reduces
informal employment by ﬁrms. However, it also reduces the ﬁrm’s wages, productivity and
investment. We argue that this is due to the ﬁrm’s limited access to ﬂexible labor.
Our paper shows that enforcement of labor regulation in the form of ﬁnes can be eﬀec-
tively used as a tool for ﬁghting informality. However, our paper also shows that informal
employment is an important source of unregulated labor for Brazilian ﬁrms, allowing them
to operate more eﬃciently, and increasing their incentives to invest in new technology. Both
of these conclusions have important implications for the design of labor regulation and of its
enforcement.
7. Appendix A - Data
The data used in the paper comes from a variety of sources and covers thirteen regions
of Brazil: Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, Santa Catarina, Rio Grande do Sul,
Parana, Goias, Mato Grosso, Ceara, Paraiba, Maranhao, Bahia and Amazonas.
25The ﬁrm level data used is the Brazilian investment climate survey collected by the World
Bank in 2002.46 The criteria used for the sample selection was the representativeness of the
population in the speciﬁed industrial and regional categories, and diversity in the ﬁrm size.
To account for these considerations a random sample was stratiﬁed using employment has
weights. The sample frame covered all the registered ﬁrms in the following industrial sec-
tors: food, textile, garments, chemicals, machinery, electronic equipment, auto components
and wood products. The selected industries together account for more than 75% of the
manufacturing value added and employment. The ﬁrst part of the survey, collects infor-
mation on diﬀerent topics: general information about the ﬁrm and its manager, business
environment and business relations, services and government regulations, labor and human
resources, production capacity, planning and innovations, supplier and client relations, in-
frastructure and services inspections, ﬁnance. The second part of the survey collects balance
sheet information for the 2000-2002 period.
We deﬁne next the construction of the main variables in the paper: Employment is the
total number of workers in the ﬁrm in 2002, Sales per employee is the total sales of the
ﬁrm in 2002 divided by total number of employees, Value added per employee is the ﬁrm’s
value added divided by the total number of employees, Wages per employee is the total
labor cost, excluding mandatory social contributions, Capital per employee is total value
of machinery and equipment at the end of 2002, excluding depreciation, divided by total
number of employees, Technology developed internally is a dummy variable that assumes
the value one when the most important way of acquiring technology is developed within the
ﬁrm, Share of high educated workers is the share of workers with at least the secondary
education, Share of females is the share of females in total workforce, Share workers with
training is the share of workers that participated in training oﬀered by the ﬁrm in the past
year, Share public ownership (foreign) is the share of the ﬁrm’s capital owned by public
(foreign) owners, Tax evasion is the share of the ﬁrm’s total sales that the manager reports
as not being reported for tax purposes, Bribes for government contracts is the share of a total
46This investment climate survey project has evolved over time within the World Bank. Previous similar
projects included the Regional Program on Enterprise Development that has been collecting ﬁrm-level data
in Sub-Saharan Africa countries for a decade and the World Business Environment Survey.
26contract with the government that the manager reports that is expected in bribes to obtain
the contract, Individual or family ownership of the ﬁrm is a dummy variable that equals one
if the largest shareholder of the ﬁrm is either an individual or a family, Internal ownership of
the ﬁrm is a dummy variable that equals one if the largest shareholder of the ﬁrm is either
the management or the employees, Government ownership is a dummy variable that equals
one if the largest shareholder of the ﬁrm is the government or a government owned ﬁrm,
Corporate ownership is a dummy variable that equals one if the largest shareholder of the
ﬁrm is either a domestic or a foreign ﬁrm, Bank ownership is a dummy variable that equals
one if the largest shareholder of the ﬁrm is a bank or an investment fund, Other ownership
includes other types of ﬁrm ownership.
Data on the enforcement of labor regulation in 2002 comes from the Ministry of Labor.
The federal system of labor inspections, which is part of the Ministry of Labor, has the
objective of enforcing all the laws and regulations, including international conventions, re-
lated with labor and employment relations and contracts (Law 55.841/65).T h ei n s p e c t o r s
of the federal system of labor inspections verify the enforcement of laws and regulations,
including those related with heath and security at work. In particular, they try to avoid
labor informality verifying that workers are formally registered with the labor authorities,
i.e., that they have a work permit (or carteira de trabalho). The Ministry of Labor is a
decentralized structure with a regional branch in each of the 27 Brazilian states (“Delegacia
Regional do Trabalho” or DRT). Within each of these branches, there are several adminis-
trative units, or subdelegacias. The concept of subdelegacia is administrative and does not
correspond to any geographical unit.47 In particular, a “subdelegacia” includes more than
one city (or municipio). In each subdelegacia there are several regional oﬃcies, of which one
is the headquarters.
The inspector responsible for each subdelegacia,o rt h esubdelegado, reports to the inspec-
tor responsible for the regional branch, the delegado. The labor inspectors (or “Auditores
Fiscais do Trabalho”) are aﬃliated only with one subdelegacia. I ng e n e r a l ,e a c hi n s p e c t o r
47Brazil is divided into 5 regions (North, Northeast, Center-West, Southeast and South) and 27 “unidades
de fomento”.
27works only for one subdelegacia and reports to the subdelegado.48 There is an eﬀort to apply
homogeneous criteria in the enforcement of the law throughout the country. This is achieved
giving continuous training of the labor inspectors, by having common implementation man-
ual and a similar software.49 The inspectors visit the plants with the objective of evaluating
the compliance with several dimensions of the labor laws and regulations. For example, they
inspect the compliance with regulations related with registration, wages, FGTS, working
hours or leave beneﬁts.
We have administrative data collected by the Ministry of Labor in 2002 at the city level
for diﬀerent variables: number of inspected ﬁrms in the city, number of ﬁn e si s s u e di nt h e
city. In particular we have information on the number of ﬁnes for diﬀerent labor violations:
informal worker ﬁnes,a r eﬁnes related with the ﬁrm not registering the worker for a work
permit, work load ﬁnes are ﬁnes related with the ﬁrm not complying with the oﬃcial work
load, wage ﬁnes are ﬁnes related with the ﬁrm not paying the minimum established by the
law, hours of work ﬁnes are ﬁnes related with the ﬁrm not complying with the number of
hours of work and the mandatory pauses, FGTS ﬁnes are ﬁnes related with the ﬁrm not
making the mandatory discounts to the FGTS, transport subsidy ﬁnes are ﬁnes related with
ﬁrm not paying the mandatory transport subsidy, and other ﬁnes are ﬁnes related with other
mandatory obligations of the ﬁrm to their workers. The total labor ﬁnes is simply the sum
of all these ﬁnes. This information was aggregated from the city level to the subregion level
using information provided by the Ministry of Labor on all the cities that belong to each
subdelegacia. Finally, we also have information on the number of regional oﬃces in each
subregion.
Data for population in 2002 and for the total number of plants in 2002 is collected by
the National Statistics Institute (IBGE) at the city level. City level data for GDP (1985),
total population (1991) average years of schooling in the population with more than 25
48This is the case of the inspections related with formal labor contracts. However, for some speciﬁc tasks,
like anti slavery inspections, inspectors from diﬀerent subdelegacias can gather to work in a team.
49At the end of 2002, there was a total of 2341 labor inspectors in Brazil which were distributed as follows
for the federal regions that we cover in the Investment Climate Survey: 35 Amazonas, 103 Bahia, 129 Ceara,
71 Goias, 45 Maranhao, 205 Minas Gerais, 34 Mato Grosso, 99 Parana, 42 Paraiba 294 Rio de Janeiro, 137
Rio Grande do Sul , 73 Santa Catarina and 489 Sao Paulo.
28years (2001), share of females (2000), geographical area (2000), transportation costs to the
nearest capital city (1995), number of train stations in the city (1995) and homicide rate
per 100000 inhabitants (2002) is collected by the Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada
(IPEA). These variables are all observed at the city level. To obtain the corresponding
variables at the subregion level, we aggregate the variables from city to the subregion level
using information provided by the Ministry of Labor on all the cities that belong to each
subdelegacia.
8. Appendix B - Lower and Upper Bounds for β
Consider the following model:
Y = α + βE + γX + ε
where Y is the outcome variable, E is the measure of enforcement and X is a set of en-
dogenous controls, such as employment, capital intensity or human capital of the workers
correlated with ﬁrms productivity (see the last three columns of the table). Assume that: (1)
β < 0 and γ > 0;( 2 )COV (E,ε)=0and COV (E,X) < 0 , since our results suggest that
more productive ﬁrms are less targeted by ﬁnes; (3) X is endogenous with COV (X,ε) > 0.
We have to decide whether to include X or not in the regression.
Excluding X of the regression:
plimβ
1




(where plim indicates probability limit) since (by assumption) γ > 0 and COV (E,X) < 0.
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29If our regional controls are not enough to drive COV (F,ε) to zero then this formal result












OLS = β −
COV (E,X)COV (X,ε)













V (E)V (X) i sb e t w e e n0a n d1 ,s ot h a tt h ee ﬀect of
COV(E,ε)
V (E) is ampliﬁed





(which is probably true from our comparison of columns 4 and 8 in table 5), including this
term in our calculations, if anything, strengthens our suggestion that we have upper and
lower bounds for β and that β is indeed strongly negative.
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32Without Regional and 
Sector Controls 
With Regional and 
Sector Controls 
(1) (2)
Log  employment  -0.77 -0.67
[0.059]*** [0.060]***
Log  sales per employee -0.82 -0.48
[0.068]*** [0.062]***
Log  value added per employee -0.76 -0.46
[0.073]*** [0.069]***
Log  wage per employee -0.39 -0.2
[0.052]*** [0.049]***
Log  capital per employee  -0.78 -0.427
[0.101]*** [0.098]***
Technology developed internaly    -0.02 0.007
[0.023] [0.024]
Share of high educated workers  -0.06 -0.031
[0.015]*** [0.015]**
Share of females  in workforce  0.08 -0.008
[0.017]*** [0.010]
Share workers with training  -0.09 -0.048
[0.019]*** [0.019]***
Age of the firm  -6.71 -4.96
[0.913]*** [0.911]***
Share public ownership in the firm   -0.004 -0.003
[0.002]** [0.002]
Share foreign ownership in the firm  -0.066 -0.044
[0.011]*** [0.011]***
Food Products -0.05 -
[0.015]***










Electronical Equipment -0.03 -
[0.011]**
Auto Components -0.04 -
[0.015]***
Wood Products 0.08 -
[0.022]***
Tax evasion in the firm  0.17 0.14
[0.013]*** [0.014]***
Bribes for government contracts in the firm 0.05 0.04
[0.009]*** [0.009]***
Individual or family ownership of the firm  0.13 0.08
[0.017]*** [0.017]***
Corporate ownership of the firm  -0.12 -0.08
[0.015]*** [0.015]***
Bank ownership of the firm -0.004 -0.002
[0.003] [0.003]
Internal ownership of the firm 0.010 0.015
[0.008] [0.008]*
Other ownership types in the firm 0.113 0.083
[0.023]*** [0.023]***
Source: Investment Climate Survey Brazil (2002)
 
Table 1: Differences between firms with and without informal labor
The numbers reported in column (1) are the coefficients of a least square regression of each variable on a dummyvariable
that assumes the value one if the firm reports a positive share of informal workers. Column (2) adds industry dummies and
subregional variables (total number of plants, population in 2002, GDP per capita in 1985 and share of females). Standard
errors are clustered at the subregional level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See data
appendix for the sources and definition of the variables. Table 2




Ln Value Added 
per Employee
Ln Wage per 
Employee
Ln Sales per 
Employee
Ln Profits per 
Employee






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Registration fines per 1000 firms in the subregion -3.48 -0.13 -0.05 -0.08 -0.20 -0.09 -0.02 -0.02
[1.04]*** [0.04]*** [0.02]** [0.03]** [0.05]*** [0.04]** [0.04] [0.01]*
Industry  Dummies  Included?  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional  controls  Included?  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1473 1,478 1,555 1,574 1,236 1,517 1,638 0
R squared  0.07 0.27 0.26 0.32 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.00
The results in the table are the least square estimates of equation (4.1) in the text. Dependent variable varies across columns (1) to (8). Standard errors are clustered at the subregion level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at
5%. Total number of plants in the subregion, total population in the subregion, log past GDP in the subregion, log past total population in the subregion, share of Females in the subregion, age of the firm and the share public
ownership of the firm included as regional controls in all the specifications but coefficients not reported. See data appendix for the sources and definition of the variables. Table 3
Enforcement of labor regulation and informal workers at the firm level in Brazil 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Method: OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Registration fines per 1000 firms in the subregion -2.14 -1.87 -2.32 -3.48 -2.16 -3.17
[0.58]*** [0.54]*** [0.57]*** [1.04]*** [1.02]** [0.83]***
Total number of plants in the subregion - -10.85 1.12 6.25 -115.98 22.25
[41.33] [41.43] [39.55] [98.09] [38.11]
Total population  in the subregion - 14.87 1.64 -0.55 156.94 -25.05
[55.90] [54.73] [53.08] [121.31] [50.19]
Log past GDP in the subregion - -6.70 -3.20 -4.05 2.00 -3.76
[2.22]*** [2.45] [2.56] [2.66] [1.95]*
Log past total population in the subregion  - 9.90 6.11 6.59 0.31 6.82
[2.16]*** [2.41]** [2.41]*** [2.76] [2.13]***
Share of Females in the subregion  - 34.94 19.28 22.12 46.77 23.97
[36.75] [37.79] [38.14] [40.26] [28.01]
Age of the firm  - - -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 -0.07
[0.04]*** [0.04]*** [0.04]*** [0.03]**
Share public ownership of the firm  - - -18.73 -17.88 -14.51 -32.18
[8.56]** [8.79]** [10.33] [11.34]***
Total labor fines per 1000 firms in the subregion - - - 0.34 0.14 0.38
[0.23] [0.23] [0.21]*
T o t a l  n u m b e r  o f  p l a n t s  i n  t h e  c i t y ---- 280.22 -
[136.96]**
T o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n   i n  t h e  c i t y ---- - 390.13 -
[172.35]**
L o g  p a s t  G D P  i n  t h e  c i t y ---- - 4 . 6 6 -
[1.31]***
L o g  p a s t  t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n  i n  t h e  c i t y ---- 7 . 1 5 -
[1.69]***
S h a r e  o f  F e m a l e s  i n  t h e  c i t y ---- 1 . 9 9 -
[15.04]
T a x  e v a s i o n  i n  t h e  f i r m   ----- 2 9 . 0 1
[3.22]***
Industry  Dummies  Included?  No  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,467 1,398
R squared  0.01 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.15
The results in the table are the least squares estimates of equation (4.1) in the text with different control variables when the dependent variable is the share of informal
workers at the firm level. Standard errors are clustered at the subregion level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See data appendix for the
sources and definition of the variables. Table 4
Enforcement of labor regulation and informal workers at the firm level in Brazil 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Method: 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Registration fines per 1000 firms in the subregion -5.40 -6.13 -5.75 -6.28 -5.05
2.619** 2.770** 2.667** 2.373*** 2.715*
Transportation costs to the nearest capital city  0.65 0.76 0.70 0.78 -
0.40 0.409* 0.406* 0.341**
Instruments Number of train 
stations 
Number of train 
stations, Average 
city area
















Regional Controls Included?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Included?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test instruments  5.01 2.97 2.23 4.48 3.48
p value  0.028 0.057 0.092 0.002 0.02
Sargan test p-value of  - 0.47 0.45 0.64 0.45
Observations 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473
The table reports the instrumental variables estimates of equation (4.1) in the text when the dependent variable is the share of informal workers at the firm level. Standard errors are
clustered at the subregion level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%. Total number of plants in the subregion, total population in the subregion, log past GDP in the subregion,
log past total population in the subregion, share of Females in the subregion, age of the firm and the share public ownership of the firm included as regional controls in all the
specifications but coefficients not reported. Number of train stations is the total number of train stations in the subregion, Average city area is the average area of the city in the
subregion, number of regional offices is the total number of regional offices in the subregion, Homicide rate is the average number of homicides per 100 thousand inhabitants in the
subregion and Transportation costs to the nearest capital city is an index of the transportation cost to the nearest capital city. The overidentification test we employ is due to Sargan
(1958). See data appendix for the sources and definition of the variables. Table 5
Enforcement of the labor regulation, tax evasion and informality at the firm level in Brazil 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Share sales not 
















Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Registration fines per 1000 firms in the subregion -0.005 ---- - -
[0.010]
Work load fines per 1000 firms in the subregion 1.26 - - - - -
[3.18]
Wage fines per 1000 firms in the subregion - - -1.03 - - - -
[2.60]
Hours fines per 1000 firms in the subregion - - - 2.8 - - -
[1.55]*
FGTS fines per 1000 firms in the subregion - - - - 1.42 - -
[1.48]
Transport subsidy fines per 1000 firms in the subregion - ---- 4 7 . 5 -
[34.24]
Other fines per 1000 firms in the subregion - ---- - 0 . 1 3
[1.34]
Total labor fines per 1000 firms in the subregion -0.001 -0.27 -0.02 -0.47 -0.57 -0.31 -0.19
[0.003] [0.34] [0.42] [0.25]* [0.41] [0.20] [0.37]
Regional  Controls  included?  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry  Dummies  Included?  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,511 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473
R squared  0.10 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Column (1) reports the least square estimates of equation (4.1) in the text when the dependent variable is the share of sales not reported for tax purposes at the firm level. Columns (2) to (7) report the least square
estimates of equation (4.1) in the text when the dependent variable is the share of informal employment in the firm using alternative measures of enforcement of labor regulations besides the registration fines. Standard
errors are clustered at the subregion level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Total number of plants in the subregion, total population in the subregion, log past GDP in the subregion, log
past total population in the subregion, share of Females in the subregion, age of the firm and the share public ownership of the firm included as regional controls in all the specifications but coefficients not reported. See
data appendix for the sources and definition of the variables. Table 6
Enforcement of Labor Regulation and Firm's Value Added per Employee in Brazil 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Method: OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Registration fines per 1000 firms in the subregion -0.10 -0.06 -0.04 -0.13 -0.12 -0.10
[0.04]** [0.03]* [0.03] [0.04]*** [0.04]*** [0.04]***
Total number of plants in the subregion - 3.99 2.58 2.9 -0.31 1.97
[1.88]** [1.71] [1.41]** [2.73] [1.25]
Total population  in the subregion - -4.74 -2.92 -3.01 1.6 -1.78
[2.52]* [2.34] [1.95] [3.33] [1.69]
Log past GDP in the subregion - 0.77 0.4 0.34 0.09 0.28
[0.14]*** [0.09]*** [0.10]*** [0.10] [0.08]***
Log past total population in the subregion  - -0.9 -0.49 -0.46 -0.09 -0.37
[0.16]*** [0.11]*** [0.12]*** [0.12] [0.10]***
Share of Females in the subregion  - -1.64 -0.01 0.13 0.05 0.58
[1.73] [1.46] [1.47] [1.50] [1.16]
Age of the firm  - - 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
[0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]***
Share public ownership of the firm  - - 2.12 2.20 1.91 0.63
[0.68]*** [0.68]*** [0.74]** [1.10]
Total labor fines per 1000 firms in the subregion - - - 0.03 0.02 0.02
[0.01]** [0.01]* [0.01]*
Total number of plants in the city - - - - 3.58 -
[3.90]
Total population  in the city - - - - -5.27 -
[4.91]
Log past GDP in the city - - - - 0.27 -
[0.08]***
Log past total population in the city - - - - -0.34 -
[0.09]***
Share of Females in the city - - - - 0.34 -
[0.62]
Ln employment in the firm  - - - - - 0.19
[0.03]***
Share of high educated workers in the firm  - - - - - 0.29
[0.08]***
Ln capital per employee in the firm  - - - - - 0.23
[0.03]***
Industry Dummies Included?  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,478 1,478 1,478 1,478 1,473 1,432
R squared  0.005 0.09 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.38
The results in the table are the least squares estimates of equation (4.1) in the text when the dependent variable is the logarithm of the value added per employee at the firm level. 
Standard errors are clustered at the subregion level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See data appendix for the sources and definition of the 
variables. Table 7
Enforcement of Labor Regulation and Firm's Value Added per Employee in Brazil
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Method: 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Registration fines per 1000 firms in the subregion -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.10 -0.10
[0.090]* [0.087]* [0.086]* [0.078] [0.099]
Transportation costs to the nearest capital city  0.14 0.14 0.14 0.16 -
[0.143] [0.147] [0.148] [0.140]
Instrument Number of train 
stations 




Number of train 
stations, 
Average city 
area, Number of 
regional offices 
Number of train 
stations, 
Average city 




area, Number of 
regional offices, 
Homicide rate 
Regional Controls Included?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Included?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test instruments  5.01 2.97 2.23 4.48 3.48
p value  0.028 0.057 0.092 0.002 0.02
Sargan test p-value of  - 0.92 0.99 0.52 0.15
Observations 1,478 1,478 1,478 1,478 1,478
The table reports the instrumental variables estimates of equation (4.1) in the text when the dependent variable is the logarithm of the value added per employee at the firm
level. Standard errors are clustered at the subregion level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%. Total number of plants in the subregion, total population in the subregion,
log past GDP in the subregion, log past total population in the subregion, share of Females in the subregion, age of the firm and the share public ownership of the firm included
as regional controls in all the specifications but coefficients not reported. Number of train stations is the total number of train stations in the subregion, Average city area is the
average area of the city in the subregion, number of regional offices is the total number of regional offices in the subregion, Homicide rate is the avera g en u m b e ro fh o m i c i d e s
per 100 thousand inhabitants in the subregion and Transportation costs to the nearest capital city is an index of the transportation cost to the nearest capital city. The
overidentification test we employ is due to Sargan (1958). See data appendix for the sources and definition of the variables. Table 8
Manufacturing performance and the share of informal workers in Brazil 
Dependent variable:
Ln Value Added 
per Employee
Ln Wage per 
Employee
Ln Sales per 
Employee
Ln Profits per 
Employee






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Share of informal workers in firm -0.01 -0.002 -0.007 -0.007 -0.004 -0.008 -0.0002
[0.001]*** [0.001]** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]** [0.001]*** [0.00039]
Industry  dummies  included?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional controls included?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,401 1,331 1,401 1,416 1,110 1,366 1,473
R squared  0.33 0.28 0.25 0.34 0.17 0.18 0.23
Share of informal workers in the firm  0.035 0.017 0.020 0.051 0.020 0.011 0.007
[0.017]** [0.009]* [0.013] [0.029]* [0.014] [0.014] [0.003]*
Instrument: Registration  fines 
per 1000 firms in 
the subregion
Registration fines 
per 1000 firms in 
the subregion
Registration fines 
per 1000 firms in 
the subregion
Registration fines 
per 1000 firms in 
the subregion
Registration fines 
per 1000 firms in 
the subregion
Registration fines 
per 1000 firms in 
the subregion
Registration fines 
per 1000 firms in 
the subregion
Industry  dummies  included?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional controls included?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,401 1,331 1,401 1,416 1,110 1,366 1,473
Panel A reports the least square estimates of different dependent variables on the share of informal workers in the firm, controling for other firm and regional characteristics. Panel B instruments the share of informal workers
with registration fines per 1000 firms in the subregion. Total number of plants in the subregion, total population in the subregion, log past GDP in the subregion, log past total population in the subregion, share of Females in
the subregion, age of the firm and the share public ownership of the firm, the total labor fines per 1000 firms in the subregion and industry dummies included as controls in all the specifications but coefficients not reported.
Standard errors are clustered at the subregion. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See data appendix for the sources and definition of the variables. 
Panel A. OLS Estimate
Panel B. 2SLS EstimatesObs Mean Std.  Dev. Min Max
Ln Employment  1,641 4.0 1.14 1.8 8.9
Ln Sales per Employee 1,577 10.7 1.26 7.1 17.5
Ln Value Added per Employee 1,480 8.9 1.33 4.1 16.7
Ln Wage per Employee 1,558 8.7 0.94 4.0 14.7
Ln Capital per Employee  1,520 7.0 1.80 -2.0 14.0
Technology   1,641 0.77 0.42 0 1
Share of High Educated Workers  1,635 0.46 0.28 0 1
Share Females  1,631 0.38 0.31 0 1.0
Share of Workers with Training  1,520 0.29 0.33 0 1
Age of the firm  1,641 18.2 17.08 0 122
Share Public Ownership  1,641 0.002 0.03 0 1
Share Foreign Ownership  1,641 0.05 0.20 0 1
Manuf. Food Products 1,641 0.08 0.27 0 1
Manuf. Textile Products 1,641 0.06 0.24 0 1
Manuf. Clothing 1,641 0.27 0.44 0 1
Manuf. Shoes and Leather Products 1,641 0.11 0.31 0 1
Manuf. Chemicals 1,641 0.05 0.22 0 1
Manuf. Machinary 1,641 0.11 0.32 0 1
Manuf. Electronical Equipment 1,641 0.05 0.21 0 1
Manuf. Auto Components 1,641 0.08 0.27 0 1
Manuf. Wood Products 1,641 0.19 0.39 0 1
Number of Plants in the subregion / 1000000000 1,640 0.11 0.15 0.01 0.6
Total Population in the subregion / 1000000000 1,640 0.08 0.12 0.002 0.5
GDP per capita in the subregion / 1000000000 1,640 0.03 0.03 0.002 0.4
Av. years of schooling in the subregion  1,640 5.25 1.21 2.64 8.42
Share of Females in the subregion 1,640 0.38 0.04 0.29 0.45
Registration fines per 1000 firms in the subregion 1,638 0.77 0.90 0 5.85
Work Load Fines per 1000 firms in the subregion 1,638 0.44 0.49 0 2.48
Hours Fines per 1000 firms in the subregion 1,638 0.53 0.71 0 3.80
Wage Fines per 1000 firms in the subregion 1,638 0.70 0.74 0 4.10
FGTS Fines per 1000 firms in the subregion 1,638 1.57 1.52 0.02 11.0
Transport Subsidy Fines per 1000 firms in the subregion 1,638 0.01 0.02 0 0.2
Other Fines per 1000 firms in the subregion 1,638 1.09 1.14 0.04 7.6
Total Labor Fines per 1000 firms in the subregion 1,638 5.12 4.53 0.17 25.9
Table A1: Summary StatisticsTable A2
Determinants of Registration Fines in the subregion in Brazil 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total labor fines per 1000 firms in the subregion 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13
[0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]***
Total number of plants in the subregion 0.49 0.49 0.81 4.91 0.05 -0.92 -1.25
[3.90] [3.93] [4.37] [4.50] [4.43] [4.43] [4.55]
Total population  in the subregion -0.49 -0.48 -0.59 -5.91 0.39 1.45 1.91
[4.99] [5.03] [5.60] [5.75] [5.70] [5.68] [5.86]
Log past GDP in the subregion -0.41 -0.41 -0.22 -0.26 -0.2 -0.37 -0.36
[0.15]*** [0.15]*** [0.15] [0.15]* [0.16] [0.15]** [0.15]**
Log past total population in the subregion  0.07 0.07 0.16 0.14 0.18 0.09 0.09
[0.16] [0.17] [0.18] [0.18] [0.18] [0.16] [0.17]
Share of Females in the subregion  -1.43 -1.13 -5.41 -4.34 -2.28 -0.79 -0.64
[2.44] [2.79] [2.85]* [2.64] [2.72] [2.94] [2.99]
Number of train stations in the subregion  0.03 0.03 - - - 0.02 0.02
[0.01]*** [0.01]*** [0.01]*** [0.01]***
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  C o s t s  t o  t h e  n e a r e s t  c a p i t a l  c i t y   - 0 . 0 8 ---- 0 . 2 2
[0.35] [0.61]
Average city area in the subregion - - -0.05 - - -0.01 -0.02
[0.03] [0.03] [0.05]
Number of regional offices in the subregion  - - - 0.03 - 0.000 0.000
[0.01]* [0.01] [0.01]
H o m i c i d e  r a t e  i n  t h e  s u b r e g i o n   ---- - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 0 1
[0.00]* [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 77 77 77 77 77 77 77
R squared  0.54 0.54 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.56 0.56
The coefficients reported are the least square regression of registration fines per 1000 firms in the subregion on different explanatory variables at the subregional level. Standard errors are
clustered at the subregion level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The regressions includes one observation per subregion in our sample. Number of train stations
is the total number of train stations in the subregion, Average city area is the average area of the city in the subregion, number of regional offices is the total number of regional offices in the
subregion, Homicide rate is the average number of homicides per 100 thousand inhabitants in the subregion and Transportation costs to the nearest capital city is an index of the transportation
cost to the nearest capital city. Table A3
Enforcement of labor regulation and informal workers at the firm level: Robustness to Different Enforcement Measures 
(1) (2) (3)
Registration fines per 1000 inspected firms in manufacturing in subregion -91.2 - -
[27.14]***
Total labor fines per 1000 inspected firm in manufacturing in subregion  12.82 - -
[5.11]**
Registration fines per 1000 inspected firm in subregion  - -322.1 -
[101.55]***
Total labor fines per 1000 inspected firms in subregion  - 35.6 -
[21.35]*
Registration fines per person in subregion  - - -15,764.3
[6,553.81]**
Total labor fines per person in subregion  - - 1,983.4
[1,546.32]
Industry Dummies Included?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regional controls Included?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,473 1,473 1,473
R squared  0.08 0.08 0.07
The results in the table are the least squares estimates of equation (4.1) in the text with different control variables when the dependent variable is the share of
informal workers at the firm level. Standard errors are clustered at the subregion level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at1 % .T o t a l
number of plants in the subregion, total population in the subregion, log past GDP in the subregion, log past total population in the subregion, share of Females in
the subregion, age of the firm and the share public ownership of the firm included as regional controls in all the specifications but coefficients not reported. See data
appendix for the sources and definition of the variables. Table A4
Enforcement of Different Labor Regulations and Firm's Value Added per Employee in Brazil
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Registration fines per 1000 firms in the subregion -0.13 - - - - - -
[0.04]***
Work load fines per 1000 firms in the subregion - -0.15 - - - - -
[0.15]
Wage fines per 1000 firms in the subregion - - 0.12 - - - -
[0.10]
Hours fines per 1000 firms in the subregion - - - -0.10 - - -
[0.08]
FGTS fines per 1000 firms in the subregion ---- 0 . 1 8 --
[0.04]***
Transport subsidy fines per 1000 firms in the 
s u b r e g i o n ----- - 2 . 1 6 -
[1.14]*
Other fines per 1000 firms in the subregion - - - - - - -0.12
[0.06]**
Industry  Dummies  Included?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional  controls  Included?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,478 1,478 1,478 1,478 1,478 1,478 1,478
R squared  0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27
The results in the table are the least squares estimates of equation (4.1) in the text with different control variables when the dependent variable is the logarithm of the value
added per employee at the firm level. Standard errors are clustered at the subregion level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. See data appendix
for the sources and definition of the variables. Total number of plants in the subregion, total population in the subregion, log past GDP in the subregion, log past total
population in the subregion, share of Females in the subregion, age of the firm and the share public ownership of the firm included as regional controls in all the
specifications but coefficients not reported. Table A5
(1) (2) (3)
Registration fines per 1000 inspected firms in manufacturing in the subregion -2.19 - -
[0.94]**
Total labor fines per inspected 1000 firms in manufacturing in the subregion 0.36 - -
[0.23]
Registration fines per inspected firm in the subregion - -8.32 -
[3.34]**
Total Labor Fines per inspected firm in the subregion - 1.43 -
[0.96]
Registration fines per person in the subregion - - -711.84
[241.72]***
Total labor fines per person in the subregion - - 151.23
[70.82]**
Industry Dummies Included?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regional controls Included?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,478 1,478 1,478
R squared  0.27 0.27 0.27
The results in the table are the least squares estimates of equation (4.1) in the text with different control variables when the dependent variable is the share
of informal workers at the firm level. Standard errors are clustered at the subregion level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significanta t1 % .
Total number of plants in the subregion, total population in the subregion, log past GDP in the subregion, log past total population in the subregion, share
of Females in the subregion, age of the firm and the share public ownership of the firm included as regional controls in all the specifications but coefficients
not reported. See data appendix for the sources and definition of the variables. 
Enforcement of Labor Regulation and Firm's Value Added per Employee: Robustness to Different Enforcement Measures 